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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MUNICIPAL
EMPLOYMENT AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
DEAN

A.

ESLING*

W

ITH the advent of a system of workmen's compensation
laws, numerous troublesome problems arose to vex both
the judicial and the legislative departments of the governments of the several states. It was to be expected that such
an important scheme of protection for labor, utterly without
precedent in the history of jurisprudence, should develop
conflicts, both external and internal. External conflicts were
promptly resolved by judicial declarations that legislation of
this character was a legitimate exercise of the police power
of the state.1 They have since ceased to exist. Internal conflicts, on the other hand, are not so easily resolved, as the
volume of litigation and the frequency of amendment well
testify. Perhaps one of the most serious of such problems is
that of determining just what classes of persons come within
the application of any given statute, either as employees or
employers. Municipal employment is but a phase of that
problem. It is, however, one of the most difficult phases to
solve.
Municipalities are now, as a general proposition, regarded as falling within the ambit of workmen's compensation legislation since they are definitely "employers" in the
sense that they hire the services of thousands of persons.
Their workers may well claim to be "employees" inasmuch
as they labor for hire rather than engage in independent
callings. Yet the basic philosophy of compensation belies
*LL. B., University of Michigan. Member of the Illinois and South Dakota Bars.
1 Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 489 (1911);
Deibeikis v. Link-Belt Co., 261 II. 454, 104 N.E. 211, Ann. Cases 1915A 241 (1914).
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such construction. That industry will produce a certain number of industrial casualties in any given period of time is a
well-known fact. That industry should pay compensation for
such economic loss, regardless of legal liability, as a necessary incident to conducting its operations, is now an accepted
premise for any theory of compensation. Society should bear
the cost of producing the goods which society demands. Government, on the other hand, though it involves public employment, produces no "goods" in the sense originally understood by the framers of workmen's compensation laws. The
earlier laws, therefore, either omitted the state and its various political subdivisions from coverage, or kept such coverage within narrow bounds. Such philosophy might, then,
be expected to have some bearing on both the subsequent
statutory enactments or amendments and the case law on
the subject of whether or not the political unit is an "employer" and its workers "employees" within the meaning of
any given act.
As in any problem which has its origin in statutory enactment, the prime concern is the language of the act itself
for there will lie the first step in resolving the problem of the
right of a municipal employee to compensation for injury
arising out of and in the course of employment. It may be
generally stated that most acts are now so worded as to
include municipalities in the class of employers, though
many permit the municipality to reject its terms. If rejection has occurred, the answer to the problem is at once apparent. If such is not the case, a second step will require the
determination of the subordinate problem as to whether the
municipality is an "employer" as to all of its workers, or
only as to a limited group. Many of the statutes make a distinction between workers in ordinary employment and those
engaged in hazardous or extra-hazardous pursuits. Another
basis for classification divides employees performing governmental functions from those carrying out the proprietary
functions of the municipality, the former being excluded
from coverage granted to the latter.
Perhaps a third step will require a determination as to
whether or not the statute creates a further division between
workers in the common sense of the term and "officials"
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elective or appointive. After analysis of this nature has occurred, there will still remain the necessity for investigation
of the case law of any given state to ascertain whether or not
there are any other exceptions as to certain types or classes
of municipal workers. Not until these questions have been
answered is it possible to say whether any given municipal
employee is covered by the provisions of any given act.
To illustrate the apparent confusion which exists in this
field, a survey of existing legislation discloses that while virtually all of the statutes include municipalities within the
generic term of employer, 2 some of the statutes impose compulsory participation by the municipality,' though most
make the act elective.4 If not totally elective, then the act is
compulsory as to hazardous or extra-hazardous occupations
and elective as to the rest; 5 or automatic in its operation but
containing provisions allowing the employer and employee
to reject its application by following certain procedure.'
Still other statutes are silent on the subject of whether or
not they are mandatory or elective.7 There may also be distinctions drawn between classes of hazardous work, as for
example between those engaged in "any of the hazardous occupations" 8 or only those engaged in "manual or mechanical
2 Texas and Arkansas do not, while Mississippi has no workmen's compensation
statute for either public or private employment.
3 Compulsory statutes are found in California, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, though some of these statutes are compulsory only as to certain groups of workers. That of Maine is compulsory as to
cities, but optional as to towns.
4 Clearly elective are the statutes of Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, and
Vermont.
5 In this category are the statutes of Illinois, Kansas, North Dakota, Oregon
and Wyoming. The Maryland act is silent as to non-hazardous workers. That of
Montana has been construed to be in this class.
6 See, for example, the statutes of Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, New Jersey,
New Mexico, and South Carolina.
7 The Arizona,
Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah, and West Virginia statutes would appear to fall
in this category. In some cases, content has been given by judicial decision, or the
language may be readily construed to demonstrate that the act is mandatory.
Precise statutory language on the point is, however, lacking.
8 "Hazardous" or "extra-hazardous" work is the key to the statutes of Illinois,
Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington
and Wyoming, but such language has usually lead to much litigation over the
question as to just what constitutes "hazardous" or "extra-hazardous" work, and
also whether such language applies to all employers or only to private employers
engaged in private business.
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work," 9 so that, by indirection, other municipal employees
are excluded. The division between "employees" and "officials" as found in certain statutes is also apt to lead to much
confusion as the descriptive phrases used to define the latter
class vary widely, 10 and statutes designed to include all
municipal employees of whatever description are relatively
rare."' When, to these conflicts, is added the problem of the
treatment to be accorded to the volunteer municipal worker,
whose activities in providing fire or police protection in the
smaller political units are often productive of the greatest
number of injuries, the picture becomes even less capable
of any universal treatment. The want of harmony in statutes
and decisions makes formulation of general rules impossible.
Reviewing the position of municipal employees or workers
as to their right to compensation can, therefore, be done
only by considering the individual regulations of the several
states.
Alabama, for example, appears to regard an elective
system as the most desirable, for its statute provides that
"any county, city, town, village or school district" though
not bound by the act, may chose to come under its provisions.U If election is made, it would seem to cover all employees to whom the employer "directly pays wages.''1
Even so, it must be noted that the description of the employer
as quoted above is not broad enough to cover employees of
the state government itself, and, as a consequence, the
courts of that state have denied protection to the employees
of subsidiary agencies of the state government such as the
14
Tennessee Valley Authority.
New Hampshire, and
9 See, for example, the statutes of Massachusetts,
Oklahoma.
found
in
the
Illinois
statute, the phrase
10 Thus, from the simple "officials"
progresses to "an official" in Louisiana; to one "holding an official position" in
Michigan, Ohio, South Dakota and Wyoming; to "elective officials" in Arizona,
Colorado, and New Jersey; to "officers elected at the polls" in Florida. In South
Carolina the phrase reads "except such as are elected by the people," while in
Vermont it is "elected by popular vote." Virginia describes them as "elected
by the people or elected by the council, or other governing body of said
municipal corporation," and the North Carolina statute is about the same.
Nebraska and West Virginia attach the qualification that they must have been
elected or appointed "for a regular term of office."
11 Only the Utah and Wisconsin statutes are broad enough to cover all employees
including "every elective and appointive officer."
12 Ala. Code Ann. 1928, § 7543; Code Ann. 1940, Title 26, § 263.
is Ibid., § 7596(d); Code Ann. 1940, Title 26, § 262(d).
14 Breeding v. Tennessee Valley Authority,-Ala.-, 9 So. (2d) 6 (1942).
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The Arizona act covers public employments,15 including the "regular members of lawfully constituted police and
fire departments of cities and towns," but specifically excludes "elective officials . . . and officials receiving more
than $2400.00 per year salary..
"16 Just who may be a
member of a "lawfully constituted" police or fire department may be a difficult question which may require judicial determination, though doubtless the intention was
to provide coverage for the employees of regularly incorporated municipalities or towns. The remaining language
seems to be clear, even though somewhat unique, yet it
required judicial determination, in Butler v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 7 to ascertain whether a city manager
whose salary exceeded the statutory limit was an "official"
within the meaning thereof, or merely an "employee." The
court found him to be an official, hence not entitled to compensation.
The Workmen's Compensation Act of Arkansas is of comparatively recent origin,"8 but it has already been subjected to amendment so as to expressly exclude from its
application all political subdivisions of the state.'9 As presently constituted, no problem in regard to public employment can be raised under the amended statute of that state.
It is one of three states in that category.
California, on the other hand, has had an extensive experience with the problem of coverage of municipal
employees. The present statute is compulsory in operation,
and the definition of "employer" found therein" would apply to municipalities, but, to make absolutely certain, a
specific section deals with public employments. 21 In the
same fashion, the definition of "employee" includes "all
elected and appointed paid public officials, ' 22 terms broad
enough to apply not only to employees in the narrow sense,
but also to their superiors. Such was not always the case
for in Jackson v. Wilde 21 a regularly employed fireman
Ariz. Code Ann. 1939, § 56-928.
16 Ibid., § 56-929.
57 Ariz. 119, 111 P. (2d) 628 (1941).
IS Ark. Laws 1939, Act 319, p. 777; Pope's Dig. 1942 Supp., 1090 et seq.
19 Ark. Laws 1941, Act 121, p. 283.
20 Cal. Code 1937, Labor Code, Ch. 2, § 3300.
21 Ibid., § 4155.
22 Ibid., § 3351.
28 52 Cal. App. 259, 198 P. 822 (1921).

.15
17
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of the City of San Diego was deemed not to be an employee within the language of the act then in existence,
nor, for that matter, was he an elected public officer. The
court placed stress on the fact that he held his office by
appointment, governed largely by city ordinance, and was
not in service under a contract of hiring. Doubtless the
decision is responsible for the present phraseology of the
statute. Two applications of the present statute are
interesting. In Los Angeles County v. Industrial Accident
Commission, 4 a deputy marshal serving in a municipal
court was held entitled to compensation, but from the city
rather than the county. Determination of this fact, the
court held, turned upon the right to discharge and, as that
function devolved upon the city, it was answerable for the
indemnity. In the other case, that of City of Long
Beach v. Industrial Accident Commission," a private detective employed by a private detective agency was injured while assisting the official police in making an arrest. He was denied compensation on the ground that he
had not been hired by the city in accordance with the provisions of its charter. Though the California code is extremely broad, it should be noted that deputy clerks,
sheriffs and constables who receive no compensation for
their services from the municipal body are denied the bene26
fits of coverage.
The language of the Colorado statute is, likewise, quite
27
broad for it specifically relates to public employments,
and covers all except "an elective official of the state, or
any county, city, town . . . " while explicitly providing that
"policemen and firemen who are regularly employed shall
be deemed employees" within the act.2 8 It contemplates that
every employer of four or more persons shall be presumed
to be under the act, 29 although its application may be re24 123 Cal. App. 12, 11 P. (2d) 434 (1932).
25 (Cal. App.) 39 P. (2d) 850 (1934), affirmed in 4 Cal. App. (2d) 624, 51 P. (2d)
1089 (1935).
26 Cal. Code 1937, Labor Code, Ch. 2, § 3352. The exception would seem unusual
but for the fact that owners of large estates and ranches frequently deputize
their employees so that they may serve as game or fire wardens. Compensation
in such situations is recoverable from the private employer.
2T Colo. Stat. Ann. 1935, Ch. 97, § 287.
29 Ibid., § 205.
28 Ibid., § 288.
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jected,3 0 and, if the employer is under the act, the employee
shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted its provisions.3 1 The choice of words "regularly employed" as used
to qualify policemen and firemen would seem to deny coverage to volunteer firemen, a view partly borne out by the
decision in Board of Commissioners of Eagle County
v. Evans.2 In that case a juror was injured while serving
as such. The court found that he was not working under
an "appointment or contract of hire, express or implied"
hence was not entitled to compensation.
Like Colorado, the statute of Connecticut, though it applies to employees of the state and its political subdivisions,"3
is not compulsory on the municipalities though it is presumed to apply to all such as have five or more employees34
unless notice of rejection is given.3" The definition of
employee now includes "any salaried officer or paid member of any police department or fire department of any
municipal corporation in the state . .
,,"6 but such definition was added closely upon the heels of, and perhaps because of, the decision in the leading case of McDonald v.
City of New Haven 7 which had held that a regularly appointed member of a city fire department was not an "employee" within the meaning of the act then in force. The
court reached such decision by reasoning that a fireman was
an officer holding office, that the contractual relationship
of employer and employee was lacking, and that if public
policy should dictate the contrary view, it was a matter for
legislative concern. Following the addition above mentioned,
8
its application was considered in Lake v. City of Bridgeport,"
in which case a special policeman was injured while
in the course of his employment. The court there found evidence of legislative intent to change the rule of the
McDonald case and, hence, permitted a recovery. A superintendent of bridges was deemed an employee rather than
30 Ibid., § 296.
31 Ibid., § 297.
99 Colo. 83, 60 P. (2d) 225 (1936).
33 Conn. Gen. Stats. 1930, Ch. 280, § 5223.
34 Ibid., § 5227.
35 Ibid., § 5228.
386Ibid., § 5223.
37 94 Conn. 403, 109 A. 176, 10 A. L. R. 193 (1920).
88 102 Conn. 337, 128 A. 782 (1925).
32
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a public officer in Burrell v. City of Bridgeport,89 and even
wider application to the act was given in Massolini v. Driscoll" by allowing the driver of an ash wagon working for an
independent contractor, engaged in hauling ashes for a city,
to recover. In so doing, the court indicated that the local
policy required liberal interpretation of the terms of the
statute defining "employer, ' 41 hence warranted treating the worker as engaged in the "business" of the city,
i. e. collecting garbage.
The situation in Delaware discloses a statute in which
the definition of "employer" includes "every corporation (private, public, municipal or public quasi) ' 42 and considers "every person in the service of the State of Delaware,
of the County of New Castle, or any corporation . . . under
any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written or
performing services for a valuable consideration" as an employee. It also extends to the "officers and servants of
the Mayor and Council of Wilmington," and other designated municipalities, "who shall have been neither elected for
a term of office of fixed and definite duration or to complete the unexpired portion of any such term . . . ,,4' but
at the same time it excepts certain other municipalities from
its operation. The act is not a mandatory one, however, for
it specifically provides the manner of election to submit to
its terms. There is, at present, no case law elaborating upon
the statutory language, but the legislative intent would
seem to be designed to confine the application of the statute
to rather narrow limits.
Though the statute of Florida expressly covers all public
employment with the exception of "officers elected at the
polls,"' 5 it is optional in its operation for it permits rejection
by either the employer or the employee under the circumstances therein stated. It also contains a fairly common provision which specifies that if any policeman, fireman or other
person is entitled to a "pension or other benefit fund" to
39 96 Conn. 555, 114 A. 679 (1921).

114 Conn. 546, 159 A. 480 (1932).
Conn. Gen. Stats. 1930, Ch. 280, § 5223.
Rev. Code, Dela., 1935, Ch. 175, § 6112.
43 Ibid., § 6113.
44 Ibid., § 6118.
45 Fla. Stat. 1941, § 440.02.
40

41
42
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which the employing municipality has contributed, the
amount of the payments therefrom shall, pro tanto, be deducted from the compensation payable under the statute.4 6
Here, too, judicial interpretation of the statute on the problems under consideration is lacking.
The neighboring state of Georgia, by contrast, not only
extends coverage to the employees of the municipalities and
other political subdivisions of the state47 but has also denied
both the employer and employee the right to reject its provisions.4 8 As a consequence, numerous decisions exist treating such employees as subject to the provisions of the act.4 9
The principal conflict has arisen, however, over the question
of whether or not policemen and firemen are "employees"
or are officials, in which case they would be outside the law.
In deciding that such persons were not "employees," 5 the
Georgia courts have pointed out that positions of this nature
are attained and retained through the application of civil
service principles hence cannot be regarded as employment
in the ordinary sense. The fact that the municipality had procured compensation insurance was, at one time, not sufficient to change this rule, 51 but, by statutory amendment,
the existence of insurance is now treated as a direct promise
by the "insurer or insurers to the person entitled to compensation."5 2 In this respect, it would seem as though any official might recover compensation if the municipality has seen
fit to procure insurance even though the statute itself pro46 Ibid., § 440.09. The fact that the employee has also contributed to such fund
does not seem to be regarded as enough to entitle him to both sources of
compensation.
47 Ga. Code 1933, § 114-101.
48 Ibid., § 114-109, states: "Neither any municipal corporation . . . nor any
employee of such corporation . . . shall have the right to reject the provisions
"
of this Title relative to payment and acceptance of compensation. ..
49 See, for example, City of Macon v. Benson, 175 Ga. 502, 166 S.E. 26 (1932);
City of Atlanta v. Pickens, 176 Ga. 833, 169 S.E. 99 (1933); Petty v. Mayor, etc.,
of College Park, 63 Ga. App. 455, 11 S.E. (2d) 246 (1940).
50 As to policemen, see Marlow v. Mayor & Aldermen of City of Savannah, 28
Ga. App. 368, 110 S.E. 923 (1922). The rights of firemen are dealt with in City of
Macon v. Whittington, 171 Ga. 643, 156 S.E. 674 (1931), and City Council of
Augusta v. Reynolds, 50 Ga. App. 482, 178 S.E. 485 (1935).
51 Parker v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 174 Ga. 525, 163 SE. 159, 81 A. L. R. 472 (1932),
though two judges dissented on the ground that the insurance carrier should be
estopped to deny coverage inasmuch as they had treated the official as an
employee. See also New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Griner, 176 Ga. 69, 166 S.E.
864 (1932).
52 Ga. Code 1933, § 114-607, added by Acts 1933, pp. 184-5.
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vides no protection for him. Under the circumstances, it is
not surprising to find the courts giving liberal interpretation
to the provisions of the act. 3
Under the Idaho law every form of municipal worker is
entitled to compensation, except judges and clerks of election
and jurors, whether regarded as an employee or an official
and whether serving as a policeman, fireman or otherwise."
The employing municipality is not obliged to secure compensation insurance, 5 for it may make payment of compensation out of current funds." If, however, the employer should
elect to insure against the risk it must give the state insurance fund a preference." At present undecided, the problem
of the status of a volunteer fireman would seem to call for
some consideration for the act is otherwise about as broad
as any that may be found.
Considerable confusion exists in the law of Illinois, perhaps partly because of a seeming wish to regard the problems of Chicago as being different from those of the other
municipalities of the state and perhaps partly from an apparent desire to afford protection to employees while denying it to officials. It should be noted at the outset that the
Illinois statute purports to be automatic in its operation, 8
but it is not universal in its application for it covers "all employers and all their employees, engaged in any department
of the following enterprises or businesses which are declared
to be extra hazardous. . . ."I' From such language it can be
seen that a dual standard has been created, one requirement being that the municipality be engaged in an "enterprise or business," and the other being that the claimant
must be engaged in one of the "extra hazardous" occupations enumerated. Further qualification is added by the defi53 Thus, in City of Atlanta v. Pickens, 176 Ga. 833, 169 S.E. 99 (1933), compensation was awarded to the dependents of a deceased street worker employed
as a member of an asphalt gang.
54 Idaho Code Ann., 1932, § 43-903. In the case of policemen and firemen,
however, any compensation is subject to deduction for any amount such individual
"may be entitled to receive from any pension or other benefit fund to which the
state or municipal body may contribute."
55 Ibid., § 43-1601.
56 Ibid., § 43-1609.
57 Ibid., § 43-1728.
58 IlI. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 139, states that the act applies "automatically
and without election to the State, county, city, town, township, incorporated

village ... or municipal corporation.
59 Ibid.
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nitions of employer and employee as found therein. While
the former term definitely covers a municipality, 60 the latter is limited to "every person in the service of the state,
[etc.] . . . except any official . . . and any duly appointed
member of the fire department in any city whose population
,"61 It is obvious, then,
exceeds two hundred thousand ..
that regular firemen serving the City of Chicago are not
covered by the act, but can it be said that those of the
smaller municipalities are protected thereby?
The statute does contain the fairly common provision
that receipt of benefits from a pension or benefit fund shall
limit the recovery to any excess over the amount of such
benefits,62 hence it is open to the inference that there is an
implied legislative intention to provide at least partial coverage for such firemen unless they could be said to be "officials" who, as such, are given no protection. Under a former
act it was decided, in City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission,6" that firemen were officers rather than employees. A
still more recent expression would seem to confirm this
view, for in the case of City of Pekin v. Industrial Commission,4 a bridge tender, appointed by the mayor under an
ordinance fixing the term of office at one year but requiring
confirmation by the city council, was held to be an "official"
of the city rather than an employee, hence compensation was
denied. In the light of these decisions, it is extremely doubtful if the firemen of the smaller Illinois municipalities are
within the ambit of the statute despite the possible inference which may be drawn from its language.
Policemen, in Illinois, do not receive the same express
or inferential treatment that is accorded to firemen. Again,
the question becomes one of interpreting the word "employee." The status of a regularly appointed police officer
was considered in City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission 5
and it was there determined that he was an official. Where
he is merely a de facto officer, that is one not holding his
60

Ibid., § 141.

61 Ibid., § 142. Chicago is the only municipality in the state having a population

in excess of the figure named in the statute according to the 1940 census.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 142.
62 Ill.
68 293 Ill 188, 127 N.E. 351 (1920).
64 341 Ill.
312, 173 N.E. 339 (1930).
65 291 IR. 23, 125 N.E. 705 (1920).
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office pursuant to municipal ordinance, he has been regarded as an employee. Thus, in Johnson v. Industrial Commission," a special traffic officer, not acting under any
ordinance, was treated as an employee so that his death in
the line of duty was regarded as a basis for compensation.
In much the same way a patrolman in the employ of both
the municipality and a merchant's protective association
was treated as an employee in Krawiec v. Industrial Commission67 so that compensation was recoverable.
While the Indiana statute expressly includes public employment, 68 applies to all municipal corporations "without
any right of exemption from the compensation provisions
S. .69 and further purports to make the definition of employee cover "every person . . . in the service of another

under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied . . .,,7 it is not as broad as would, at first glance, seem
to be the case. Though the statute contains no express exclusion of officials from among those covered, such a meaning
has been read into it by judicial decisions 71 on the theory
that such persons, when discharging duties imposed on them
by law, are exercising a part of the sovereign power of the
state and are not, therefore, under "any contract of hire" as
required by the statute. Upon this reasoning, it was, at one
time the rule that the act did not permit compensation to
firemen injured in the course of duty.72 A breach was made
in this doctrine, in 1920, by the decision in Frankfort General
Insurance Company v. Conduitt73 in which case the insurance carrier was found to be estopped from contending that
a fireman was an official since they had included his wages
in the computation of the premium basis for a compensation
policy. In a still more recent case, that of City of Huntington
7 4 the former doctrine was rejected and the widow
v. Fisher,
of a fireman killed in the discharge of his duties was granted
67 372 Ill. 560, 25 N.E. (2d) 27 (1940).
326 Ill. 553, 158 N.E. 141 (1927).
Burns, Ind. Stat. Ann. 1933, § 40-1701 (a).
69 Ibid., J 40-1218. See also Acts, 1929, Ch. 72, § 18, p. 536.
70 Ibid., § 40-1701.
71 City of Fort Wayne v. Hazelett, 107 Ind. App. 184, 23 N.E. (2d) 610 (1939);
Shelmadine v. City of Elkhart, 75 Ind. App. 493, 129 N.E. 878 (1921).
72 City of Fort Wayne v. Hazelett, 107 Ind. App. 184, 23 N.E. (2d) 610 (1939).
73 74 Ind. App. 584, 127 N.E. 212 (1920).
74 -Ind.-, 40 N.E. (2d) 699 (1942).
66
68
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a recovery on the ground that the deceased was an "employee" under the act. In arriving at that decision, the court
stressed the fact that since firemen are not specifically excluded from either the compensation act or the firemen's
pension fund act, they must be, by inference, deemed covered thereby. The reasoning would seem equally applicable
to policemen, though the traditional division between "employees" and "officials" would probably be respected as to
other officers.
The Iowa statute is compulsory in its application to municipalities,7 5 but it expressly excludes "an official elected
or appointed by the state, county, school district, municipal
corporation, city under special charter or commission form
of government, 76 and denies the benefit of its operation to
any person, employed by a municipality, "who may be entitled to benefits" from any fireman's or policeman's benefit
fund of such municipality." Though the act seems clear on
the latter point, it became necessary for the court, in Ogilvie
v. City of DesMoines,78 to declare that only those policemen
who are not entitled to a pension can participate in the compensation scheme. In other respects, the courts of that state
have shown a tendency to be strict in applying the statute,
particularly on the point of whether or not an employeremployee relationship existed at the time of the accident.
Thus a county relief worker has been treated as not being
such an "employee, ' 7 and a person who donated his services in landscaping grounds owned by a city has been denied
recovery on the same theory.8 0 Volunteer firemen and policemen would, therefore, probably be denied compensation.
The coverage provided by the statute of Kansas, as applied to municipal employees, requires careful analysis. It
extends to all employers engaged in hazardous occupations
and also to those engaged in "trade or business," who,
whether municipal or private employers, are subject to a
compulsory application of the statute." Other municipalities
Iowa Code 1939, Ch. 70, § 1362.
Ibid., § 1421.
77 Ibid., § 1361 (4).
78 212 Iowa 117, 233 N.W. 526 (1930).
79 Oswalt v. Lucas County, 222 Iowa 1099, 270 N.W. 847 (1937).
80 Norman v. City of Chariton, 206 Iowa 790, £21 N.W. 481, 28 N. C. C. A. 831n
(1928).
81 Kans. Stat. Ann. 1935, Ch. 44, Art. 5, 1 44-595.
75
76
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may, however, elect to come within its terms and be bound
thereby. The definition of "employee," however, stresses the
term "workman" or one "who has entered into the employment of or works under contract of service . .. with an employer." 2 For that reason a state police officer has been
held not covered since he was not regarded as a "workman." 8' 3 In much the same way, a clerical employee in the
office of a city clerk was denied compensation,8 4 so it may
be inferred that only municipal employees of the laboring
class are protected in those municipalities which are forced
under the act. In municipalities entitled to an election, the
act may still be operative if the municipality engages in a
"trade or business." Two cases, both arising in Kansas City,
have given content to those words. In one case, McCormick
v. Kansas City,"' a workman in a steam-heating plant which
furnished heat for the city hall was deemed to be engaged in
trade or business as well as a hazardous employment, hence
entitled to compensation. In the other, Simpson v. Kansas
City,86 a street laborer, injured while breaking up pavement,
was denied recovery on the theory that street work was not
a trade, business, or proprietary enterprise on the part of
the municipality 87but was rather an exercise of a governmental function.
Kentucky, while expressly including municipalities in
the term "employers" as used in the statute, 8 has made
that statute purely elective in operation,8 9 consequently it
can have no operation where election has not occurred. In
Caudill v. Pinsion,° therefore, an injunction was issued
against a municipality preventing it from paying the medical
expenses of a person injured while assisting a police officer
execute a search warrant on the ground that such payment
amounted to an unauthorized expenditure of municipal funds
82

Ibid., § 44-5080i).

Though the court
felt that there was good reason why a policeman should be covered by compensation, it deemed itself bound by the clear language of the statute.
84 Udey v. City of Winfield, 97 Kans. 279, 155 P. 43 (1916).
86 137 Kans. 915, 22 P. (2d) 955 (1933).
85 127 Kans. 255, 273 P. 471 (1929).
87 The court expressly refused to follow Esque v. City of Huntington, 104 W.
Va. 110, 139 S.E. 469, 54 A. L. R. 785 (1927).
88 Ky. Rev. Stat. 1942 (Baldwin's Current Ed.), § 342.010.
89 Ibid., § 342.390 and § 342.395.
90 233 Ky. 12, 24 S.W. (2d) 938 (1930).
83 Griswold v. City of Wichita, 99 Kans. 502, 162 P. 276 (1917).
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inasmuch as the city in question had not accepted the provisions of the statute. Unless election has occurred, then, the
workmen's compensation act of that state will have no bearing on municipal liability to an injured employee.
While the Louisiana statute is compulsory in its application to cities and villages and expressly names them as
employers, it also excludes from the benefit of its coverage
each "official of . . . any . . . incorporated village or city or
"91 As to those employees
other political subdivision ...
covered, no element of hazard need enter into the service
performed so that, in this respect, public employment is
dealt with differently from private service,9 2 but the "employee" classification has been held within narrow limits. In
Hall v. City of Shreveport,93 a policeman appointed pursuant
to city charter was deemed a public official rather than an
employee on the ground that there was no contract of employment between the city and the officer, the latter being
treated as holding his office by reason of appointment by
the sovereign. In still another case, that of Coleman v. Maryland Casualty Company,94 a night watchman of an incorporated town was also given an "official" status so as to
debar recovery.
The workmen's compensation act of Maine is broad
enough to cover municipal employees, but while compulsory
as to cities it is merely optional as to towns.9 5 As a consequence, it was held, in Palmer v. Inhabitants of Town of
Sumner,96 that a road worker who had sued on the theory
that the statute had changed the common-law liability of the
town could not recover inasmuch as the town in question had
not elected to come under its provisions. A highway worker
employed by a city, however, was entitled to the benefits of
the act, according to the decision in Tuttle's Case, 7 which
granted recovery to his dependents when he was killed on a
91 La. Gen. Stat. (Dart), 1939. Ch. 15. § 4391.
92 Charity Hospital v. Board of School Directors, (La. App.) 146 So. 487 (1933),
annulling opinion in (La. App.) 140 So. 60 (1932.).
93 157 La. 589, 102 So. 680 (1925).
94 (La. App.) 176 So. 143 (1937).
95 Rev. Stat. Maine 1930, Ch. 55, § 2, makes the statute applicable to such towns
as "vote to accept the provisions of this act."
96 133 Maine 337, 177 A. 711, 97 A. L. R. 1292 (1935).
9T 126 Maine 349, 138 A. 559 (1927).
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highway construction job. It has also been judicially decided,
in that state, that a policeman is an employee rather than an
official so that compensation may be awarded for his death
or injury in the line of duty. 8
Only those municipal employees of Maryland who work
for wages and who are engaged in "extra-hazardous work"
may receive the benefits of the statute of that state, but, as
to them, it matters not whether the municipality is engaged
in an enterprise for "pecuniary gain or otherwise ...
By
amendment in 1941, police officers of the state police force
and of certain of the smaller political subdivisions are
treated as workmen for wages within the meaning of the statute,"0 but the amendment also provides that if equal or better provision be made for the employees by city charter or
municipal ordinance then the claimant may not have the
benefit of the act. Only one source of compensation is, therefore, provided. Though the statute purports to define extrahazardous employment, the listing does not appear to be inclusive enough, hence a burden has been placed on the courts
of Maryland to determine what is and what is not "extrahazardous" work within the meaning thereof. They have
decided that a nurse in a municipal charitable hospital, 10 1
a hospital orderly,'10 2 a janitor, 10 and a janitress 0 4 are not
engaged in activities of the type contemplated.
The statute of Massachusetts comes closest to the original philosophy of workmen's compensation, for, while being purely optional on the part of the employing municipality,"° it extends only to "laborers, workmen and mechanics" employed by any such municipality. 10 Moreover, it
provides that in the event the city has provided a pension
fund, the injured employee must elect as to which he will
receive as he cannot have both. 10 7 The interpretation that
98

Moriarty's Case, 126 Maine 352, 138 A. 555 (1927).

99 Ann. Code Md. (Flack) 1939, Art. 101, 1 46.
100 Laws Md., 1941, Ch. 433, p. 728.
101 Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Smith, 168 Md. 458, 177 A. 903 (1935).
102 Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Trunk, 172 Md. 35, 190 A. 756 (1937).
103 Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Schwind, 175 Md. 60, 199 A. 853
(1938).
104 Mattes v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, (Md. App.) 26 A. (2d)
390 (1942).
105 Ann. Laws Mass. 1933, Ch. 152, 9 69.
106 Ibid., I 74.
101 Ibid., 1 73.
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has been given to the terms "laborers, workmen and mechanics" has been rather strict. Though a city janitor has been
held to be both a "laborer" and a "mechanic" so as to entitle him to compensation, 1 8 other employees have not been
so fortunate. Thus, in Devney v. City of Boston,19 a "hoseman and a member of a fire company" was treated as a
public officer, and, in Lesuer v. City of Lowell,"' a teacher
in the automobile department of a vocational school was
held not to be a "mechanic" but an instructor, with a consequent denial of recovery in each case. It has, likewise,
been held that a "call" fireman on an annual salary of five
dollars per year, plus seventy-five cents per hour while on
active duty, is not entitled to the classification of laborer."'
The history of the Michigan statute discloses that it has
undergone many changes, all designed to extend its application to new classes of persons. As presently constituted it
applies to "each county, city, township, incorporated village
. . . authorized by law to hold property and to sue and be
sued generally""' 2 and expressly covers "every person in
the service of the state or of any county, city, township,
incorporated village . . . under any appointment, or contract
113 Ofof hire, expressed or implied, oral or written ....
ficials elected at the polls are, however, expressly excepted
from coverage. Not only are regular policemen and firemen included in the definition of employees, but even volunteer policemen are regarded as such for the act provides
that, for the purpose of computing compensation, volunteer
policemen are presumed to receive $27.00 per week for their
services." 4 It is, therefore, not surprising to find decisions
permitting recovery of compensation by policemen of incorporated villages u 5 as well as those employed by cities."'
Regular members of municipal fire departments, even to
108 White v. City of Boston, 226 Mass. 517, 116 N.E. 481 (1917).
109 223 Mass 270, 111 N.E. 788 (1916).

110 227 Mass. 44, 116 N.E. 483, L. R. A. 1918F 197 (1917).
ill Randall's Case, 279 Mass. 85, 180 N.E. 669 (1932).
112 Mich. Stat. Ann. 1937, Ch. 150, § 17.145.
114 Ibid., § 17.147.
113 Ibid., § 17.147.
115 LaBelle v. Village of Grosse Pointe Shores, 201 Mich. 371, 167 N.W. 923
(1918).
116 Lyons v. City of Grand Rapids, 274 Mich. 588, 265 N.W. 470 (1936); Millaley
v. City of Grand Rapids, 231 Mich. 10, 203 N.W. 651 (1925); Walker v. City of
Port Huron, 216 Mich. 361, 185 N.W. 754 (1921).
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the fire chief, are employees under the act,"7 but an in18
teresting decision in Laidlaw v. City of Ludington' has
placed "call" firemen in a different category from volunteers. It was there held that a "call" fireman, paid $33.00
each three months, was to be treated as a regular member
of the municipal fire department and compensation computed on his quarterly salary rate rather than the presumed
compensation of $27.00 per week used as the basis for computation in cases of volunteers.
While the Minnesota statute was at one time elective, 119 it has, since 1939, been made compulsory as to all
contracts of employment made after the effective date of the
amendment then added. 120 As a consequence all municipal
employers, including "state . . . county, village, borough,
121
town, city, school district and other public employers,'9
must provide compensation for their employees other than
those officials "who shall have been elected or appointed
for a regular term of office or to complete the unexpired
portion of any regular term .... 122 Sheriffs, deputy sheriffs,
constables, marshals, policemen and firemen are employees within the provisions of the act. It has also been provided that if the "several municipal subdivisions" of the state
do not carry compensation insurance they are to be treated as "self insurers. 123 The present statute reflects considerable thought on the part of the draftsmen who prepared
the same, and is probably worded to meet the interpreta4
tions given earlier statutes by the Minnesota courts,'1 2 but
it is silent on the status of volunteer firemen. In Stevens
v. Village of Nashwauk,125 however, it was held that a volunteer fireman who was paid at the rate of $2.00 for each
call was under the act when injured while responding to a
call. Another troublesome issue may turn on the question
of whether or not the alleged employee had been hired by
Carothers v. City of Stanton, 257 Mich. 107, 241 N.W. 178 (1932).
118 272 Mich. 11, 261 N.W. 120 (1935).
119 Mason's Minn. Stat. 1927, Ch. 23A, § 4272.
120 Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., § 4272-1.
121 Mason's Minn. Stat. 1927, Ch. 23A, § 4326(d).
122 Ibid., § 4326(g) (1).
123 Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., § 4272-3.
124 As to policemen, 'see State v. District Court, 134 Minn. 26, 158 N.W. 790
(1916); as to firemen, see Behr v. Soth, 170 Minn. 278, 212 N.W. 461 (1927).
125 161 Minn. 20, 200 N.W. 927 (1924).
117

MUNICIPAL EMPLOYMENT

AND WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

227

proper authority. One decision may help clarify that problem, for in Reed v. Township of Monticello,126 where a road
patrolman had hired a helper to cut brush but the town
board subsequently approved the hiring by paying the helper's wages, the latter was regarded as an employee entitled
to compensation.
As presently constituted, the statute of Missouri does
not apply to municipal employees unless the municipality
elects to accept the provisions thereof "by law or ordinance. 1 27 Problems may arise under that act, if a municipality does make an election, as to just who will constitute an "employee" within its operation, but at present no
decisions exist giving content to that term. Whether it will
be held extensive enough to include officials is a matter of
some doubt in the light of the general attitude around the
country excluding such from compensation benefits unless
expressly designated as being entitled thereto.
The language of the Montana act is broad enough to cover municipal employees who are defined therein as being
persons employed "under any appointment or contract of
hire, expressed or implied, oral or written . . . and appoint12 Such statute
ed paid public officers and officials ...
must, however, be read in the light of the decision in Moore
v. Industrial Accident Fund12 which limited the coverage
thereof to only those appointed public officers and officials
who were engaged in hazardous occupations. Further weakness exists in the statute over the point as to whether or
not it is compulsory or elective, and, if compulsory, whether so as to all municipal employees or only those engaged
in hazardous work. Internal conflict, produced by the use of
loose language, 80 was severely criticized in City of Butte
3 ' which held the
v. Industrial Accident Board of Montana,"
statute compulsory as to municipalities engaging in hazardous enterprises. That decision, by inference, leaves the act
elective as to other municipalities. Compensation for vol126 164 Minn. 358, 205 N.W. 258 (1925).
127 Mo. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 29, § 3693-4.
128 Rev. Code Mont. 1935, Vol. 2, Ch. 256, § 2862-3.
129 80 Mont. 136, 259 P. 825 (1927).
180 Compare, for example, Rev. Code Mont. 1935, Vol. 2, Ch. 256, §§ 2840,
2845 and 2846.
181 52 Mont. 75, 156 P. 130 (1916).
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unteer firemen for disabilities incurred in the performance
of their duties is dealt with in a separate statute, enacted
in 1935, which creates an independent plan for their pro32
tection. 1
Even though the Nebraska statute applies to municipal
employment and expressly includes policemen and firemen,
whether volunteer or regular, it denies protection to "any
official of the state, or any governmental agency created
by it, who shall have been elected or appointed for a regular term."' 33 A person who holds office indefinitely, or during good behavior, would, therefore, seem to be included
rather than excluded from its operation.'3 4 Furthermore,
for lack of any statutory limitation thereon, it has been held
that a covered employee is not barred because he might
participate in benefits from another source 13 or has even
accepted such other benefits.'3 8 In 1941, the statute was
amended to provide that, in case of injury to a volunteer
fireman, the basis for calculating compensation should be
the amount of money such individual receives from his regular employment.3 7
Perhaps one of the most comprehensive statutes is that
found in Nevada, for it states that where a "state, county,
municipal corporation, school district, cities under special
charter and commission form of government . . . is employer, the terms, conditions and provisions of this Act . . .
shall be conclusive, compulsory, and obligatory upon both
",138
It specifically includes
employer and employee.
"all elected and appointed paid public officials' 119 and further provides that volunteer firemen are within the terms
thereof. For purpose of compensating the latter, the wage
base is computed at $150 per month."' The absence of
132 Rev. Code Mont. 1935, Ch. 392, § 5158.1 to 5158.12.
133 Comp. Stat. Neb. 1929, Art. 1, Ch. 48, § 48-115.
134 Such was the application given thereto in Rooney v. City of Omaha, 105

Neb. 447, 181 N.W. 143 (1920), involving a police officer, and in Shandy v. City of
Omaha, 127 Neb. 406, 255 N.W. 477 (1934), involving a fireman, at a time when
these municipal servants were not expressly named in the statute as the beneficiaries thereof.
185 Shandy v. City of Omaha, 127 Neb. 406, 255 N.W. 477 (1934).
136 City of Lincoln v. Steffensmeyer, 134 Neb. 613, 279 N.W. 272 (1938).
137 Comp. Stat. Neb. 1941, Ch. 48, Art. 1, § 48-126.
138 Nev. Comp. Laws 1929, § 2680, subsection 1(a).
(a).
139 Ibid., § 2688, subsection 7
140 Ibid., § 2688.
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case law in that jurisdiction would tend to indicate that the
inclusiveness of the statute has eliminated problems which
might otherwise arise.
In contrast, the law of New Hampshire is elective as to
municipal bodies, since it provides that acceptance of the
provisions thereof shall be made "for a town by the selectmen thereof, for a city by the city council or by any board
or officer having like powers . . . ''4
and even then the
act would seem to apply only to "workmen engaged in manual or mechanical labor" of the type specified in the statute. 1 In the absence of decisions throwing light on the exact scope of the statute, it is impossible to draw any inferences as to the real breadth of coverage granted thereby. It could, however, hardly be considered as protecting
elected or appointed officials since no court has deemed them
to be within the term "workmen."
New Jersey, by its statute, has seen fit to extend the
protection of workmen's compensation to municipal employees, including volunteer firemen, 143 but further provides
that "no person holding an elective office shall be entitled
to compensation.' 144 Acceptance of the provisions of the
act is presumed unless affirmative action is taken by either
party, following a statutory form of procedure, to reject its
terms. 1 45 Any covered employee is expressly entitled to
the benefit of any retirement or pension plan in addition to
the benefits conferred by the statute, 14 and the act further
specifies that relief workers shall be regarded as engaged
in only "casual employment" so far as the municipality is
concerned. 1 47 Though the statute is of fairly broad caliber,
it became necessary in Rogan v. City of Burlington148 for
the court to decide whether a policeman elected by a city
council was a "person holding elective office" within
the meaning of the provision denying benefits to such a perNew Hamp. Laws 1937, Ch. 147, § 4-a.
Pub. Laws New Hamp. 1926, Ch. 178, § 1.
143 Rev. Stat. N. J. 1937, Title 34, Ch. 15, § 15-75. In case of injury to a volunteer
fireman, his compensation is based on the salary or wages he receives from his
private employment.
141
142

144
146
147
148

Ibid., § 15-43.
Ibid., § 15-43.
Ibid., § 15-43.1.
39 N. J. L. J. 214 (1915).

145

Ibid., § 15-9.
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son. It was held that "elective office" meant one to which the
incumbent was chosen by the voters of the municipality,
hence the court granted compensation to the injured officer.
In New Mexico, the test for the right to compensation
is to be found in the fact that the employee must be engaged
in "any of the extra-hazardous occupations or pursuits"
therein described,14" 9 but the statute expressly enumerates
as within such category all duly elected or appointed peace
officers of the state, county or municipality. 50 As to them,
while the statute is presumed to be in operation, it may be
rejected but such rejection must occur before the injury
happens.' 5 ' There is no case law interpreting the statute,
but the Attorney General of the state has expressed the opinion that the same does not apply to a volunteer fireman who
is without a contract of employment with the munici152
pality.
Judicial interpretation of the New York statute has shifted remarkably in the course of a short period of time. The
fundamental premise behind the law of that jurisdiction is
the protection of workers in "hazardous" employments, for
the definition of employee is "any person working for an
employer whose principal business is that of carrying on or
conducting a hazardous employment.' 15 Though the term
employer includes the state, a municipal corporation, or other political subdivision thereof, it is likewise qualified by a
reference to "hazardous" employments.'" Following out
such concept of protection to workers in dangerous occupations, the court in Stoerzer v. City of New York,' denied
149 N. Mex. Stat. Ann. 1941, § 57-902.
150

Ibid., § 57-910.

151 Ibid., § 57-904.
152

Opin., Attorney Gen., 1931-2, p. 163.

153 Baldwin's Consol. Laws N. Y. Ann., Vol. 7, Art. 1, § 2(4).
154 Ibid., § 2. Section 3 of the statute divides employment

into a number of
groups. Of these, group 17 represents employees of the municipal corporation
engaged in hazardous work who, by reason of Art. 4, § 50, are deemed to be
protected unless positive rejection has occurred; group 19 includes volunteer
firemen of a municipal corporation; while group 20 covers the teachers, regular
or substitute, in trade schools in cities having a population of 1,000,000 or more.
As to the last two, affirmative election to be bound is necessary. Town superintendents of highways and volunteer firemen are "employees" under the
definition laid down in § 2(4).
155 267 N. Y. 339, 196 N.E. 281 (1935).
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compensation to a city physician who was injured while performing an operation on an inmate of a city prison. That
decision was predicated on the ground that the evil aimed
at was one involving industrial employees, hence the statute should not be construed to be applicable to municipal
employees in the absence of language bringing them within its scope. Six years later, however, the court in Leahy
v. City of New York 56 granted compensation to an injured
reception clerk working in the office of the city Board of
Water Supply on the ground that such clerical work was
"incidental" to one of the hazardous employments. The court
there indicated that coverage of municipal employees was
co-extensive with that of private employment. The New York
act has also been held not to be limited to pursuits for
pecuniary gain, for workers in hazardous occupations connected with the performance of governmental functions have
157
also been granted compensation.
A mandatory statute in North Carolina, at least as applied to the state or any political subdivision thereof, extends protection to "all officers and employees thereof, except such as are elected by the people or elected by the
council or other governing body of said municipal corporation . . . who act in purely administrative capacities and
who serve for a definite term of office."1'58 As applied to
employers generally, the act is operative only as to those
with five or more employees. A question arose, therefore,
in Rape v. Town of Huntersville,15 9 in which compensation
for the death of a town police officer was sought, as to whether that limitation applied also to municipal employers. The
court held that a distinction existed between private and
public employment by reason of the fact that the statute
was mandatory as to the state and the political subdivisions
thereof, 10 and it consequently granted recovery.
While the North Dakota statute applies to the state and
its political subdivisions, its application is compulsory only
285 N. Y. 443, 35 N.E. (2d) 34 (1941).
Hughes v. City of Buffalo, 208 App. Div. 682, 203 N. Y. S. 391
Kittle v. Town of Kinderhook, 214 App. Div. 345, 212 N. Y. S. 410 (1925).
158 N. C. Code 1939, Ch. 133A, § 8081(i), subsection (b).
159 214 N. C. 505, 199 S.E. 736 (1938).
160 N. C. Code 1939, Ch. 133A, 9 8081 (o).
156
157
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as to persons engaged in hazardous employment, 6 ' with
reference to whom the employer may, upon contribution to
the state fund, insure itself against liability.8 2 As to all
other employees, the municipality is free to make an election. 1 63 In 1937 the act was broadened to bring volunteer
firemen within the protected class on the same basis as
and, in 1941, electfull-time firemen in paid departments,'
ed officials of the state and the several counties thereof were
added to the class of "employees.' 6 In Fahler v. City of
Minot 6 6 the widow of a police officer sought compensation
for his death occurring in the course of duty. The city defended on the ground of its common-law immunity from liability. Finding that the nature of the employment involved
a hazardous occupation and finding that the city had not
seen fit to relieve itself from liability by contributing to the
state fund, the court denied the defense, saying that the intention of the legislature to provide compensation for all employees engaged in hazardous occupations "seems quite evident from some of the outstanding features of the law under
consideration."' 6 7 A night watchman in a village, however,
has been denied compensation.' 6 8
The Ohio statute not only expressly covers the employees of cities and incorporated villages, 169 but in defining the
term employees states that it includes "regular members of
lawfully constituted police and fire departments" but does
not cover any "official."' 7 0 Compensation claims by policemen and firemen are, however, limited to the excess of the
compensation allowance above amounts received from any
benefit or pension fund. The Ohio act is unusual in that all
employers, public or private, are required to contribute to
a state insurance fund 7 ' and this provision has been held
Comp. Laws N. Dak. 1913, 1925 supp., Ch. 5, § 396 (a) (2).
Ibid., § 396 (a) (6).
163 Ibid., § 396 (a) (12).
164 Laws N. Dak., 1937, Ch. 178, p. 326.
165 Laws N. Dak., 1941, Ch. 303, p. 571.
166 49 N. D. 960, 194 N.W. 695 (1923).
167 49 N. D. 960 at 974, 194 N.W. 695 at 699.
168 Bergstrand v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 69 N. D. 447, 287
N.W. 631 (1939).
169 Page's Ohio Gen. Code Ann. 1936, § 1465-60.
170 Ibid., § 1465-61.
171 Ibid., § 1465-62.
161
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valid. 7 ' The scope of the act was under consideration in
Industrial Commission of Ohio v. McWhorter,' where it
was held applicable to a municipal relief worker paid partly
in cash and partly in groceries, but in Davis v. Industrial
Commission of Ohio'7 4 a village marshal was regarded as
an "official" hence not within its terms. Though no case can
be found on the subject, the Attorney General has rendered
an opinion that volunteer firemen are employees of
the municipality within the meaning of that term as used
in the statute, even when acting outside of the municipal
limits.'75 Protection to municipal workers in Ohio is, therefore, fairly extensive.
Progressing to Oklahoma, a statute is there found which
circumscribes within narrow limits the classes entitled to
coverage, for only municipal workmen in hazardous employments doing "manual or mechanical work" are protected, 7 '
and then only if engaged in a "trade, business or occupation
carried on by the employer for pecuniary gain."'' 77 Within
such limits, it has been held that an occupation ordinarily
carried on by a private person for pecuniary gain does not
lose its character when carried on by a municipality, 7" but
a school district is not a "municipality" within the meaning
of the statute. 19 A town marshal serving as a night watchman, though deemed to be engaged in hazardous work, was
not regarded as performing "manual or mechanical" labor
An employee engaged
so failed to recover compensation.'
in street cleaning was likewise denied a recovery in City of
8
- for the court
Muskogee v. State Industrial Commission,1
held the municipality was not engaged in street cleaning "for
pecuniary gain" but was, rather, performing a governmental
function. A plumbing inspector was also denied recovery in
Porter v. Hopkins, 91 Ohio St. 74, 109 N.E. 629 (1914).
129 Ohio St. 40, 193 N.E. 620, 96 A. L. R. 1150 (1934).
174 54 Ohio App. 453, 7 N.E. (2d) 829 (1936).
175 Opin. Atty. Gen. 1940, No. 2520.
176 Okla. Stat. 1941, Title 85, § 3(4).
177 Ibid., § 3(5).
178 Payton v. City of Anadarko, 179 Okla. 68, 64 P. (2d) 878 (1937).
179 Ponca City Board of Education v. Beasley, 157 Okla. 262, 11 P.
(1932).
18o Mashburn v. City of Grandfield, 142 Okla. 247, 286 P. 789 (1930).
181 150 Okla. 94, 300 P. 627 (1931).
172
173
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City of Tulsa v. Hunt1 82 because not engaging in an hazardous occupation and being also engaged in governmental
rather than proprietary work. A county road worker, on the
other hand, has had the benefit of the statute since his occupation fitted the "hazardous-mechanical" classification, and,
at the same time the county was regarded as carrying on
work for pecuniary gain. l"" Few courts would agree with the
interpretation there given to the words "pecuniary gain" but
most would agree with the decision in another case, to-wit:
that a male citizen doing road maintenance work pursuant
to the terms of a state statute was not an "employee" of the
4
township so was not entitled to compensation therefrom."
Though the preamble of the Oregon law declares that
there is broad need for workmen's compensation to avoid
resort to common-law litigation and the consequent necessary expense attendant thereon,8 5 the statute is compulsory
only as to municipalities engaged in hazardous occupations
as defined in the act, and even then only if the city has a population of less than one hundred thousand.' Included among
those engaged in hazardous occupations are "salaried peace
officers and firemen of the State, counties and municipal corporations,' 1 s7 but by the same section, any municipal plan
of compensation for such workers serves to supersede the
statute. Judicial interpretation of that law is, at present,
lacking.
The workmen's compensation act of Pennsylvania puts
municipalities, the Commonwealth, and all the governmental
agencies created by it, in the employer group, 8 8 but defines
employees as synonymous with "servants." It does, however, expressly include volunteer firemen in that category
both while "going to and returning from any fire" which the
company has attended, 8" though it is careful to deny that
182 164 Okla. 262, 23 P. (2d) 640 (1933);
183 Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County v. Bilby, 174 Okla. 199,

50 P. (2d) 398 (1935).
184 Board of Trustees v. State Industrial Conunission, 149 Okla. 23, 299 P.
155 (1931).
185 Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. 1940, Vol. 7, § 102-1701.
187 Ibid., § 102-1725(h) (1).
186 Ibid., § 102-1714.
188 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann. (Perm. ed.), Title 77, § 21.
189 Ibid., § 22.
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the employees of independent contractors doing work for the
municipality are servants thereof. 9 ' Perhaps the chief problem in Pennsylvania has been to determine who is and who
is not an "employee." In Bock v. City of Reading' a foreman of the garbage disposal and recovery plant was regarded as such, and, in Bricker v. Supervisors of Heidelberg
Township,'9 2 coverage was granted to a township superintendent who was also the road master. Neither of these persons were deemed to be officers. Four volunteer firemen injured when returning from a firemen's convention were,
however, denied recovery in another case' since the protection afforded them is limited to the period when engaged
as firemen or while going to or returning from a fire.
The elective provisions of the Rhode Island act are unusual in that, to make the same applicable to any city or
town, a vote of the electors is necessary, 9 4 but once election
has occurred, the procedure is the same as is the case with
other employers.9 5 The class of employees is, however,
limited by the requirement that such persons be ones "whose
remuneration does not exceed $3,000.00 a year" and shall
not include the members of "regularly organized fire and
police departments of any town or city" or employees of a
contractor doing work for it.' 96 In reiterating the expression "city or town" the legislature has demonstrated an intent to confine the coverage rather than extend it to other
political subdivisions of the state, and, being elective, it can
have very limited application to municipal workers. It is not
surprising, therefore, that no case law can be found elaborating on the text of the law.
South Carolina, like a number of other states, has had a
statute since 1936 naming the state, all political subdivisions,
190 Ibid., § 441.
191 120 Pa. Super.
192 120 Pa. Super.
193 Shindledecker
867 (1941).
194 Gen. Laws R.

468, 182 A. 732 (1936).
378, 183 A. 61 (1936).
v. Borough of New Bethlehem, 145 Pa. Super. 77, 20 A. (2d)
I. 1938, Ch. 300, Art. 7, § 1. As if to re-emphasize the elective

character of the statute, Art. 9, § 1(a), in defining employers includes only a city
or town who shall "vote to accept the provisions of this chapter in the manner
herein provided."
195 Ibid., Art. 7, § 7.
196 Ibid., Art. 9, § I(b).
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and all public and quasi-public corporations as "employers," ' and including all municipal workers of whatever
character in the definition of "employees" except such as
are "elected by the people or elected by the council or other
governing body ... who act in purely administrative capacities and to serve for a definite term of office."' 9 The act is
presumptively operative though it may be rejected, but to
accomplish that end specific notice must be given.'9 9 Forced
labor does not entitle one to coverage, for "city, county or
municipal prisoners and convicts" are excluded from benefits.2"0 Whether policemen and firemen are covered would
depend on the manner of their appointment. If they are not
"elected by the people or by the council or other governing
body," it would seem that they would enjoy protection, but
this issue has not yet been settled by the courts.
Election by the municipality is essential to put the South
Dakota statute into operation as to its employees,20 1 but
once operative it extends to all employees, including constables, marshals, policemen, firemen and volunteer firemen,
except officials "elected or appointed for a regular term of
office or to complete the unexpired portion of any such
202 Though this latter phraseology may engender
term ..
some confusion, one fact has been judicially established, towit: no person is an "employee" unless he has entered into
a contractual relationship with the municipality, not even
if his work is done under the supervision of a municipal officer. That point was decided in Bergstresser v. City of Willow
Lake, 203 in which case a relief client working in a gravel pit
to obtain surfacing material for city streets, paid from federal funds, though acting under the supervision of the mayor,
was denied a recovery since the court could find no contractual relationship with the city.
Compensation is not granted in Tennessee unless the muCode of Laws S. C. 1942, Vol. 4, § 7035-2.
198 Ibid., § 7035-2(b).
199 Ibid., § 7035-4.
200 Ibid., § 7035-16(c).
201 S. Dak. Code 1939, § 64.0102.
202 Ibid., § 64.0102(2) (b). For purpose of compensation, the volunteer fireman's
wages are fixed at $27.50 per week.
203 63 S. D. 386, 259 N.W. 276 (1935).
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nicipal employer has elected "at least thirty days before the
happening of any accident" to accept the terms of the local
statute." 4 It is, then, operative as to persons "in the service
of an employer . . . under any contract of hire, apprenticeship, written or implied. ' 205 Since no other specific qualification on the term "employee" appears in the act, any limitations must be found in the judicial decisions of the state.
From an examination thereof it appears that a policeman
is an "officer" rather than an "employee" under contract of
hire, hence will be denied compensation even though the
municipality has elected to come under the statute.0 6 In the
same way, for lack of a contract of hire "written or implied," a relief client working on city streets under the Federal Emergency Relief Administration has been denied compensation in Shelton v. City of Greeneville. °7
Texas is one of the three states which make no statutory
provision for the protection of municipal employees since
not only is its statute silent on the subject,0 " but it has been
judicially held to be inapplicable to them. 200 The doctrine
of estoppel has, however, been successfully invoked against
insurers who have accepted premiums from the municipality for workmen's compensation policies. Thus, in McCaleb
v. Continental Casualty Company,210 it was held that an
action on such policy would lie in favor of the employee directly against the insurer. In Great American Indemnity
Company v. Blakey 2 ' such an action was also sustained
against a stock company on much the same ground, even
though the local law permitted the municipality to purchase
insurance only in a mutual organization.
The words "employee," "workmen," and "operative"
as found in the Utah statute are to be read in the light of a
specific provision therein that such words shall include:
Williams' Tenn. Code Ann. 1934, Vol. 4, Ch. 43, § 6856.
Ibid., § 6852(b).
206 Cornett v. City of Chattanooga, 165 Tenn. 563, 56 S.W. (2d) 742 (1933).
207 169 Tenn. 366, 87 S.W. (2d) 1016 (1935).
208 Vernon's Civil Stat. Tex. Ann., Title 130, Art. 8309, § 1.
209 City of Tyler v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, (Tex. Civ. App.) 288 S.W.
409 (1926); McCaleb v. Continental Casualty Co., 132 Tex. 65, 116 S.W. (2d)
679 (1938).
210 132 Tex. 65, 116 S.W. (2d) 679 (1938).
211 Tex. Civ. App., 107 S.W. (2d) 1002 (1937).
204
205
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Every elective and appointive officer, and every other person, in the
service of the state or of any county, city, town or school district . . .
under any election or appointment, or under any contract of hire, express
or implied, written or oral, including all officers and employees of the
212
state institutions of learning.

It may be seen, therefore, that the act is comprehensive both
as to employers and employees, and would seem to be automatic in its operation for nothing is said therein about acceptance or rejection. It does, however, provide that the municipality "may insure in the state insurance fund or pay
compensation direct. ' 213 Despite the apparent breadth of
coverage provided, it has been held in Utah that a volunteer
fireman gets no protection therefrom,2 1 4 and that a precinct
constable working out of a city court is not an employee of
that city. 215 On the other hand, a relief worker laboring on
city streets was given protection, 21 as was also a city marshal who injured himself while cleaning a gun,217 both of
whom were regarded as municipal employees.
In Vermont, the act is elective in character, 21 and applies to public employments, but then only protects employees other than "public officials who are elected by popular vote or who receive salaries exceeding two thousand dollars a year. "219 It is specific, however, on the point that
"policemen, firemen, and others entitled to pensions shall be
220
deemed employees" within the meaning of the statute,
but the acceptance of any pension shall reduce, pro tanto,
the amount of compensation. The disposition of other possible internal conflicts in the law must remain to be determined since the statute has not yet been subjected to judicial
interpretation.
Utah Code Ann. 1943, § 42-1-41(1).
Ibid., § 42-1-46.
214 Bingham City Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 390, 243 P. 113
(1925). Though the decision involved the application of an earlier statute, it
turned on a definition of "employee" as used therein which was similar to that
used in the present act. The case would, therefore, seem still to be law.
215 Rich v. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 511, 15 P. (2-d) 641 (1932).
216 Weber County-Ogden City R. Com. v. Industrial Com'n, 93 Utah 85, 71 P.
(2d) 177 (1937).
217 Beaver City v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 8, 245 P. 378 (1926).
218 Pub. Laws Vt. 1933, Title 30, Ch. 264, § 6498.
219 Ibid., 6 6485 (vi).
220 Ibid., § 6505.
212
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Virginia has a compulsory statute insofar as municipal
employment is concerned,2 2' but emphasis is placed therein
on the fact that it is the "worker" group who are to receive
protection, for benefits are extended to all officers and employees "except such as are elected by the people or elected
by the council, or other governing body . . 222 Policemen
and firemen in municipalities having a population of less
than 100,000 are now under the act, so, in that respect, the
rule of Mann v. City of Lynchburg228 which regarded a policeman as a public officer rather than an employee, has been
partly abrogated. The employees of independent contractors, even though engaged in municipal work, have, however, been denied the benefit of statutory protection since
the essential "contract of hire or apprenticeship" required
to make one an employee has been found to be lacking in
224
such situations.
Before the municipalities of the state of Washington
come within the ambit of the statute of that state they must
be found engaging in "extra-hazardous" activities,222 in
which case the law is mandatory in its application. It would
also seem to be applicable even if the work is being done by
an independent contractor on behalf of the municipality. 2 1
Included in the definition of "extra-hazardous" employment
is the work performed by the "salaried peace officers" of
the political unit, but whenever "provision is made for such
peace officer injured in the course of employment" the statutory protection shall cease.2 27 The material issue in every
case would, therefore, seem to be the question as to whether
or not the employee is working in a dangerous occupation.
In Reid v. Department of Labor and Industries2 8 a carpenter employed by the Emergency Relief Administration
was regarded as being primarily in relief work, hence not in
an "extra-hazardous" occupation, but in a later case, where
a relief worker was so occupied and municipal funds had
Va. Code 1942, Ch. 76A, § 1887(2).
222 Ibid., § 1887(2) (b).
129 Va. 453, 106 S.E. 371 (1921).
224 Bamber v. City of Norfolk, 138 Va. 26, 121 S.E. 564 (1924); City of Portsmouth v. Daniels, 157 Va. 614, 162 S.E. 324 (1932).
225 Remington's Rev. Stat. Wash., Title 56, Ch. 7, § 7674.
226 Ibid., § 7692.
227 Ibid., 1 7674(a).
228 194 Wash. 108, 77 P. (2d) 589 (1938).
221
228
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been appropriated for the performance of the extrahazardous task, recovery under the act was permitted. 29
An unusual feature- in the act of West Virginia is worthy
of notice. The statute requires that "all governmental agencies or departments created by it" shall subscribe to the
state workmen's compensation fund,2 30 and, failing in this,
23 1
it deprives the employer of the common-law defenses. '
While it expressly excludes "any elective or appointive official of the state, whose term of office is definitely fixed by
law,"2 32 it makes no such specific reference to the officials
of municipalities or other political subdivisions of the state.
There is, therefore, left in doubt the question whether the
officials of the subordinate agencies are protected or not,
and such doubt has not yet been resolved by judicial decision.
One case, however, is significant. In Esque v. City of Huntington2 3 a street worker sued in a common-law action for
damages because the city had not come under the act in the
manner provided. The city contended that, since the work
engaged in was of a governmental nature, the act did not
apply and the common-law defenses were available to it. In
upholding a verdict for the plaintiff, the court pointed out
that the prime problem was one of statutory construction,
that the decisions of other states were of little value in that
regard, and that there was no basis, under the act, for any
distinction between municipal work of a proprietary character from that done in the exercise of a governmental function. It said, in the course of the decision, that: "The purpose
of the act . . . is to provide compensation for employees,
injured while engaged in any sort of work, governmental or

industrial

....

",234

Such language might, therefore, be con-

strued as broad enough to bring the officials of the subordinate agencies of the state within the terms of the statute.
Proponents of extensive coverage of municipal workers
would do well to consider the Wisconsin statute as a model.
229 Blake v. Department of Labor and Industries, 196 Wash. 681, 84 P.
365 (1938).
230 W. Va. Code, 1937, Ch. 23, § 2511.
231 Ibid., § 2518(8).
232 Ibid., § 2511(1).
283 104 W. Va. 110, 139 S.E. 469, 54 A. L. R. 785 (1927).
234 104 W. Va. 110 at 113, 139 S.E. 469 at 470.
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Expressly applying to municipalities and making the coverage automatic,23 5 the statute extends to all municipal workers, whether elected, appointed or hired, including policemen, firemen, and volunteer members of fire companies.23' To prevent double compensation, however, the act
permits the deduction, in cases of policemen and firemen,
of any sum received from a pension or benefit fund to which
the municipality may have contributed.2 3 7 Judicial construction of the statute has, in general, observed the liberality evident in its language. Thus, in Village of West Salem
v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin,23 a person engaged
in assisting the village marshal in suppressing a disturbance was held entitled to compensation inasmuch as he was
regarded, for the purposes of the act, as being a policeman since the marshal had the legal right to command such
assistance from a private person. Another case, on somewhat similar facts, reached a similar conclusion, 23 9 and the
express statutory language was held sufficient to justify
granting a recovery to a volunteer fireman.2 4 ° The element
of "hiring" is, however, of importance for, in Village of West
Milwaukee v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin,241 a relief worker doing "made" work for a village was denied
the benefits of the statute since he was not serving "under
any appointment or contract of hire, express or implied" as
required by the act.242
Though the statute of Wyoming is compulsory as
to municipalities, it extends only to workers engaged
in "extra-hazardous" occupations, 24 3 and defines workmen
as persons employed "under a contract of service" but not
including those engaged in "clerical work" or those "holding an official position." 2"1 Statutory enumeration is
235 Wis. Stat. 1941, § 102.04 and § 102.05. The latter section, however, permits
withdrawal.
236 Ibid., § 102.07.
237 Ibid., § 102.07(2).
238 162 Wis. 57, 155 N.W. 929 (1916).
239 Village of Kiel v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 163 Wis. 441, 158
N.W. 68 (1916).
240 City of West Bend v. Schloemer, 202 Wis. 319, 232 N.W. 524 (1930).
241 216 Wis. 29, 255 N.W. 728 (1934).
242 Wis. Stat. 1941, § 102.07(1).
243 Wyo. Rev. Stat. 1931, HI 124-102, 124-103, 124-106, and 124-107(h).
244 Ibid., § 124-107(D.
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provided for the various occupations deemed extra-hazardous, which list was amended in 1941 to expressly include
"the occupations of city or town firemen and city or town
policemen. "245 It would seem, from the decision in Leslie
v. City of Casper,"' that to be entitled to benefits the employee must not only have been hired to serve in one of the
extra-hazardous occupations, but that the injury for which
compensation is sought must flow directly therefrom. In that
case, claimant was injured while impounding animals, and
sought recovery not on the ground that the precise work
engaged in was extra-hazardous, but rather because he was
also employed as a truck driver, an occupation definitely
scheduled as such. Recovery was, however, denied on the
ground that he was not within the act at the time of the injury.
From this analysis of the statutes and decisions of the
several states it is obvious that no general principles can
be promulgated on the subject of the relationship of municipal employment to workmen's compensation. A person
working in this field should, however, bear in mind that
the answer to a specific problem may possibly be arrived
at by asking a series of questions.
First: Is the municipality an "employer" within the scope
of any given act? In that connection it may be well to determine if it is such by compulsion or by election, bearing in
mind that in some cases the act is automatic in operation
unless a rejection has occurred and in others the election
must take an affirmative form.
Second: Is compensation granted only in hazardous or extrahazardous situations? If so, is the injured employee one working in or related to such occupations. It should also be remembered that, not infrequently, coverage is granted in
such cases only where the municipality is acting in some
proprietary capacity, as opposed to exercising a governmental function, or is conducting a "trade or business"
for profit.
Third: Is the given worker an "employee" or an "officer?"
245
246

Laws Wyo. 1941, Ch. 122, p. 154.
42 Wyo. 44, 288 P. 15 (1930).
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Coverage granted the former is frequently denied to the
latter, but to determine just who constitute "officers" may
frequently require recourse not only to statutory definitions
but also to judicial precedents. It may be said that neither
of these terms possess a clear-cut definition.
Fourth: Is the worker one hired and paid by the municipality, so some contractual basis exists between them? If not,
it is quite likely that the worker will be treated as a volunteer and denied a recovery unless the statute is specifically
designed to protect him.
Even when these questions have been answered satisfactorily, certainty of compensation for the injured worker is not
an assured fact, just as a negative answer does not necessarily debar recovery.
Though the trend may be said to be in the direction
of a wider application of workmen's compensation laws for
the benefit of municipal employees, statutory and case differences are wide, ranging from the most liberal treatment
to the most narrow limitation. Full realization of these differences warrants the suggestion that a uniform statute on
this topic be adopted. It should, however, be so drafted as
to embody the broadest application in order that the progress made in some jurisdictions be not lost.

